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Who Gets the Better Deal?: A Comparison

of the U.S. and English Infancy Doctrines
By SIMON GOODFELLOW*

I. Introduction
In some American states, a 17-year-old can purchase an automobile
from an adult for a reasonable price, drive it around-even crash it-and
then return it to the seller for a full refund. Can an English minor do the
same? In both the United States and England, rights and liabilities under
contract law are different for minors than for adults. The general theory is
that adults have the full power to bind themselves contractually, whereas
minors do not.' Therefore, both countries allow minors to avoid contracts
that they have made, with some exceptions. This is known as the 'infancy
doctrine.' 3 However, although U.S. law is based on and was once the same
as English law, U.S. law has evolved such that the law in the majority of
U.S. states is now different from English law.n This Note seeks first to
compare and contrast the current infancy doctrines of England and the
United States.
Both legal systems are also aware that giving too much protection to
minors may lead to situations where they may take advantage of adults who
contract with them in good faith.5 The key differences between U.S. and
*

J.D. Candidate, University of Califomia, Hastings College of the Law, 2006.

1. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 420-21 (2d ed. 1998) (re
U.S. law); SIR GUENTER TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 539 (1 1th ed. 2003) (re English

law).
2. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 422 (re U.S. law); TREITEL, supra note 1, at 539 (re
English law).
3. Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Wis. 1980).
4. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructingthe Myth of the "Infancy Law Doctrine":
From Incapacity to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481, 525 n.4 (1994).
5. TREITEL, supra note 1, at 539 (re English law). See e.g., Dodson v. Shrader, 824
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English law regard whether, and how, they seek to balance the often
conflicting interests of the minor and the adult. Therefore, this Note seeks
second to evaluate which country favors which party over the other and the
repercussions of this choice.
The age of majority in England, and in most American states, has been
reduced from 21 to 18 years of age.6 Because many of the difficult cases
before this reduction involved an adult contracting with a minor who was
between 18 and 21 years old, this has reduced the practical importance of
the fact that minors are treated differently under contract law.7 However,
the effect of this reduction has been offset somewhat by the increased
activity of those under 18 in the marketplace. For example, in the United
States, the average spending by teenagers is $66 per week, and in 2002
teenagers in the United States spent a total of $179 billion. Consequently,
many would argue that because youths under the age of 18 today are more
sophisticated, knowledgeable, and active in the marketplace, allowing them
to avoid the consequences of their actions in that marketplace by avoiding
their contracts is unfair and ignores reality.

II. English Law
The general rule in England is that a minor is not bound by his
contracts. 9 There are three exceptions to the general rule and minors'
contracts can thus be divided into four categories as follows: contracts for
necessaries, beneficial service contracts, voidable contracts, and
unenforceable contracts.'
A.

Contractsfor Necessaries

The doctrine of necessaries can be traced back to 1765.1 The doctrine
holds that a minor must pay a reasonable price for necessaries which have
been supplied to him. 12 This rule was codified in 1979 in the Sales of
S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tenn. 1992) (re U.S. law).
6. Family Law Reform Act, 1969, c. 46, § 1 (Eng.) (reducing the age of majority in
England from 21 to 18); FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 423 (re U.S. law).
7. TREITEL, supra note 1, at 539 (re English law); FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 423
(re U.S. law).
8. Kelly Konrad, Minors and Money, LANSING ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2004), available at
<www.lsj.com/yourguide/personalfmance/ygf_040131_kidmoney.html>.
9. ANDREW BAINHAM, CHILDREN: THE MODERN LAW 522 (2d ed. 1998).
10. Id. at 523-25.
11. DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 488 (citing Zouch v. Parsons, (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1103
(K.B.)).
12. MICHAEL P. FURMSTON ET AL., CHESHIRE, FIFOOT AND FURMSTON's LAW OF
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Goods Act.' 3 Because the minor is liable for a reasonable price rather than
the contract price, liability is based on quasi-contract, or 4 an implied
promise to pay, rather than enforcement of the actual contract. 1
Under English common law, necessaries were defined as "such
articles as are fit to maintain the particular person in the state, station and
degree ... in which he is.' 5 In 1979, necessary goods became statutorily
defined as those "suitable to the condition in life of the minor.. . and to his
actual requirements at the time of the sale and delivery."' 6 The decision as7
to whether something is a necessary is therefore partly a subjective one.'
The court will first decide if the article is something that could, as a matter
of law, be a necessary.' 8 Examples would include clothes, food and
lodging.' 9 In Ryder v. Wombwell, the court held that, as a matter of law, a
pair of jeweled solitaires and an antique goblet could not be considered
necessaries for a minor.2 ° On the other hand, if the article could be a
necessary as a matter of law, the question of whether it was a necessary to
the particular minor is submitted to the jury.2' In Peters v. Fleming, the
court held that a watch could, as a matter of law, be a necessary for a minor
undergraduate, and therefore the issue of whether a gold watch chain was a
necessary was submitted to the jury.22 Under English law, the important
distinction is not simply between basic items and luxuries. Luxurious
items of utility could be considered necessaries depending on the particular
minor and the circumstances.2 3 In Nash v. Inman, a tailor sued a minor
Cambridge undergraduate who had failed to pay for eleven "fancy
waistcoats. 2 4 The court ruled against the tailor, and the minor was thus
allowed to keep the waistcoats without paying for them.25 The court held
that the waistcoats were not necessaries-not because they were luxuries
CONTRACT 480 (14th ed. 2001).

13. Sales of Goods Act, 1979, c. 54, § 3 (Eng.).
14. Nash v. Inman, [1908] 2 K.B. 1 (Eng. C.A.).
15. Peters v. Fleming, (1840) 6 M. & W. 42, 46.
16. Sales of Goods Act, supra note 13, at c. 54, § 3.
17. BAINHAM, supra note 9, at 522.
18. TREITEL, supra note 1,at 540.
19. FURMSTON, supra note 12, at 479.
20. (1868) L.R. 4 Exch. 32, 38.
21. FURMSTON, supra note 12, at 479.
22. (1840) 6 M. & W. 42.
23. TREITEL, supra note 1, at 540.
24. FURMSTON, supra note 12, at 479.
25. Id.As will be seen later, although the law of necessaries stated in this case is still
good law today, under current law the minor would likely not have been able to keep the
waistcoats and not pay for them.
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but because the particular minor already had an ample supply of
waistcoats.2 6
B. Service Contracts
The second category under English law is that of beneficial service
contracts.2 7 If a service contract is on the whole beneficial to the minor, the
minor is bound by that contract. 28 For example, in Clements v. L & NW Ry,
a minor was hired by a railway company as a porter and joined the
company's insurance plan. 29 The company's plan provided coverage for a
greater range of accidents than the statutory plan, but the level of
compensation was lower. 30 The court held that overall the agreement was
beneficial to the minor and thus binding on him.3 ' In contrast, in
DeFrancesco v. Barnum, the court held that overall the agreement in
question was not beneficial to the minor.3 2 The minor entered into an
apprenticeship contract with a master to be taught stage dancing for seven
years.33 The minor agreed not to accept professional engagements without
the master's permission and not to marry during the apprenticeship. 34 The
contract did not oblige the master to find engagements for the minor and he
only had to pay the minor when she performed.3 5 The court held that the
contract was invalid and unenforceable since overall it was not beneficial to
the minor.3 6
C.

Voidable Contracts

If a contract is not for necessaries or for a beneficial service, then it
falls into one of two remaining categories. The first is voidable contracts.3 7
If a contract is one where the minor acquires an interest in some subject
matter of a permanent nature, i.e., one involving continuous or recurring
obligations, then the contract is voidable by the minor.3 8 There are four
26. Id.
27. Id. at481.

28.

BAINHAM,

supra note 9, at 524.

29. TREITEL, supra note 1, at 543.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
FURMSTON, supranote 12, at 482.
Id.
ld.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 483.
Id.

Who Gets the Better Deal?

2005]

such subject matters: land, shares in a company, partnership agreements,
and marriage settlements.39 If the minor repudiates such a contract while
still a minor, or reasonably soon after attaining majority, he is released
from any future liabilities under the contract, but cannot recover money
already paid unless there was a lack of consideration. 40 Thus, for example,
a minor lessee can disaffirm the lease at any time on the ground that he was
a minor when he entered into the contract and will not have to pay future
rent, but he will not be able to claim a refund of the rent he has already
paid. 4'
D. Unenforceable Contracts
In England, if a contract does not fall within one of the above three
exceptions, it is unenforceable against the minor unless he ratifies it after
attaining majority.4 2
Ratification may be express or implied from
conduct.4 3 Implied ratification may occur if the former minor acts as if the
contract is binding on him. 44 In such a case, the minor may be considered
to have ratified the contract, and it is enforceable against him. 45 The
difference between this category and the voidable category is that in the
latter, the contract is enforceable against the minor unless he voids it, and
in the former, the contract is unenforceable against the minor unless he
ratifies it. The fact that a contract is unenforceable does not mean it has no
legal effect.46 First, the adult remains bound by the contract. 47 Second,

legal consequences for the minor may still flow from it, as will be seen
below.

48

III. U.S. Law
Like English law, the general rule of U.S. law is that a minor lacks the
capacity to bind himself to contracts. 49 However, whereas English law
divides minors' contracts into four categories, U.S. law divides them into
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

TREITEL, supra note 1, at 545-47.
BAINHAM, supra note 9, at 525.
TREITEL, supra note 1, at 545.
Id.at 549.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See BAINHAM, supranote 9, at 524.
See id.
See id.
FAISWORTH, supra note 1, at 422.
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two-contracts for necessaries and voidable contracts.
A.

Contractsfor Necessaries

As in England, a minor in the United States is liable for the reasonable
price of necessaries supplied to him.5 ° The reasoning is that if adults refuse
to contract with minors at all, because of the risk that they will disaffirm,
minors would not even be able to purchase goods necessary for life and
may starve.51 Courts used to refer to a generic list of necessaries including
board, room, clothing, medical needs and education. 52 However, modem
U.S. courts seem to place more emphasis on the facts of the case. For
example, in Valencia v. White, a minor was engaged in a trucking
business.5 3 The court held that because the minor lived at home and
received food, lodging and clothing from his parents, it was not necessary
for him to engage in business.54 Therefore, repairs to the minor's truck,
which he used in his business, were not necessaries for that particular
minor. Thus in both the United States and England,
whether something is
56
a necessary is a question of both law and fact.
As Valencia suggests, whereas English law treats necessaries and
beneficial service contracts as two separate categories, U.S. courts tend to
evaluate service contracts under the necessaries doctrine. For example, in
Ex parte Odem, medical services rendered to a minor were held to be
necessaries. 57 In Zelnick v. Adams, the state supreme court held that legal
services could be necessaries as a matter of law and remanded for a
determination of whether the legal services provided to the minor to protect
his inheritance were necessary to the particular minor as a matter of fact.5
Therefore, the overall effect is that the law in this area in both countries is
basically the same.
B.

Voidable Contracts
In the United States, all contracts that do not fall into the necessaries

50.
51.
52.
53.

See, e.g., Garay v. Overholtzer, 631 A.2d 429, 443 (Md. 1993).
Turner v. Gaither, 83 N.C. 357, 364 (1880).
DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 489.
654 P.2d 287, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).

54. Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
See also Exparte Odem, 537 So. 2d 919, 920 (Ala. 1988).
Id.
561 S.E.2d 711, 717-18 (2002).
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category described above are voidable by the minor. 59 In other words, the
minor may repudiate them at any time before reaching majority or within a
reasonable time afterwards. 60 Upon attaining majority, the former minor
may ratify a contract he made while a minor, thus ending his ability to void
it, in one of three ways: express ratification, ratification by conduct, or
failure to void it within a reasonable time after attaining majority. 6 ' This
allows the minor to secure the advantage of contracts which turn out to be
advantageous and to be relieved of the effects of contracts which were
injudicious.62 As was explained above, England has two categories for
contracts that are not for necessaries or beneficial service contractsvoidable contracts and unenforceable contracts. The United States could be
said to have combined these two categories and has no separate category
for contracts involving a subject matter of a permanent nature.
IV. The Liability of a Minor upon Disaffirming a Contract
As described above, in both the United States and England, it is
possible for a minor to enter into a contract and later avoid it. However,
both countries have had to deal with the question of what happens when the
minor seeks to avoid the contract. Does the adult have to give the minor a
full refund even if the minor has nothing left? Does the minor have to give
the adult only what is left of the consideration he received? Or should the
minor have to account for any depreciation to the consideration or, in other
words, restore the adult to status quo ante? It is in the response to these
questions that the laws of the two countries have shown most divergence.
This Note will next examine two scenarios where these questions come into
play.
In the first, a mature-looking minor purchases an automobile for cash
from an adult merchant who has no knowledge that the purchaser is a
minor. The minor then uses the automobile, thus reducing its value, and
may even crash it. The minor then demands the return of the purchase
price upon tendering the remains, arguing that because he was a minor
when he bought the automobile he is lawfully permitted to disaffirm the
contract.
In the second, the same mature-looking minor buys an automobile on
credit. He uses the car, thus reducing its value, and later refuses to pay
59.
60.
61.
62.

FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 424.
Id.at 425.
Id.
Human v. Hartsell, 148 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).
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what he owes. When the adult merchant sues, the minor seeks to use his
minority at the time of the contract as a defense. The minor thus refuses to
either return the automobile or pay for it.
This Note will compare and contrast the law in England and the
United States in these two scenarios. Consequently, this Note will seek to
discover if one country favors the minor more than the other.
A.

The English Minor's Liability When He Seeks to Disaffirm a Cash
Purchaseof an Automobile

In England, the right to avoid is based on two principles.6 3 The first,
and more important, principle is to protect a minor from his own
improvidence and from adults who might seek to take advantage of his
inexperience. 64 The second is to minimize unnecessary hardship to adult
merchants who deal with minors in good faith. 65 Thus it has long been
settled under English common law that "where an infant ha[s] received
something for which he ha[s] given consideration, if he [i]s unable to return
that for which the consideration. .. passed he [can]not recover the
consideration. ' '66 In other words, "he [i]s not to be allowed to recover
money paid for what he ha[s] consumed or used., 67 Thus if a minor in
England buys an automobile for cash and uses it such that it depreciates in
value, he is allowed to disaffirm the contract and return the car, but the
adult need only refund the present value of the automobile.
B.

The American Minor's Liability When He Seeks to Disaffirm a Cash
Purchase of an Automobile

In the United States, there is a jurisdictional split on this issue. This
split was apparent as far back as 1894:
Many-perhaps a majority--of the American decisions, apparently
thinking that the English rule does not sufficiently protect the infant,
have modified it... to hold that although the contract was in all respects
fair and reasonable, and the infant had enjoyed the benefits of it, yet if
63.

TREITEL,

supra note 1, at 539.

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Valentini v. Canali, [1886-1890] All ER. Rep. 883 (Q.B.D.). See also Johnson v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 59 N.W. 992, 994 (Minn. 1894) (stating that this area of
English law was "well-settled," citing Valentini, and indicating that the Valentini court, in
stating this law, had been approving the earlier case of Holmes v. Blogg, (1818) 8 Taunt.

508).
67. Id.
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the infant had spent or parted with what he had received, or if the
benefits of it were such that they
could not be restored, still he might
68
recover back what he had paid.
Thus the majority of American states base their rule on only the first
of the two principles recognized by English law, i.e., that minors need
protection from their own inexperience in the marketplace which might
otherwise lead them to "squander[] their wealth through improvident
contracts [with] crafty adults who would take advantage of them ....69
Thus the majority of states do not seek to protect adult merchants acting in
good faith. After the minor has made use of what he purchased, and even if
he has nothing left to return, the minor can disaffirm the contract on the
ground that he was a minor at the time of the purchase and receive a full
refund of what he paid the adult.70 For example, in Halbman v. Lemke, a
minor purchased a car from an adult and drove it around to the point where
it broke down. 71 The court held that the minor should receive a full refund
despite the depreciation in value.72
Even courts applying the American rule 73 have acknowledged its
apparent injustice.74 In Harwell Motor Company v. Cunningham, the court
held that a minor who had purchased an automobile and used it for two
years could disaffirm the contract and recover back the full amount paid.75
The court stated that although this conclusion went "against the grain to
some extent[,] ... it is the law that a minor can disaffirm a ...contract not
' 76
for necessaries[.]
Other courts applying the American rule have viewed it as the just
thing to do, and not just a matter of precedent. The Halbman court, for
example, held that "to require a disaffirming minor to make restitution for
diminished value is, in effect, to bind the minor to a part of the obligation
which by law he is privileged to avoid. ' ' 77 In other words, the law seeks to
68. Johnson, 59 N.W. at 993.
69. DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 487 (re U.S. law); TREITEL, supra note 1, at 539 (re
English law).
70. DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 486.
71. 298 N.W.2d 562, 563 (Wis. 1980).
72. Id.
73. I am calling this rule the "American rule" rather than the "majority rule" since using
the "majority rule" may cause confusion considering the article is about minors and
mentions the age of majority.
74. DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 489.
75. 337 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).
76. Id.(emphasis added).
77. Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Wis. 1980).
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protect minors from their inexperience in the marketplace, and reducing
their recovery in any way when they disaffirm eviscerates this protection.
An argument can be made that the American rule does not leave adult
merchants completely unprotected if they take steps to protect themselves,
i.e., ask the age of those to whom they sell. If the adult does so and the
minor affirmatively lies about his age, then the adult may have two possible
defenses if the minor later seeks to assert the infancy doctrine and8
disaffirm. First, some states allow the adult to assert equitable estoppel.1
The minor is estopped from asserting that he was a minor because at the
time of the purchase he affirmatively claimed he was not. Second, the
majority of states see the misrepresentation as a fraud.7 9 In these states, a
minor who misrepresented his age at the time of the purchase 80may still
disaffirm the contract, but he may be liable in tort to the merchant.
i.

Arguments againstthe American Rule

Several courts and commentators have made the argument that the
American rule favors minors too much and that the infancy doctrine has
become a sword, when it was supposed to be a shield.8 They argue that
there has been a divergence between the theoretical reasons for the infancy
doctrine and the reality today where many minors are sophisticated and
experienced enough to, and actually do, regularly operate in the
marketplace8 2 Because the doctrine's end is to protect infants, when it is
used by an infant who needs no protection, an injustice is done on the adult
merchant. Since the end of the 19th century, some states have moved away
from the American rule and adopted alternative rules.8 3
There are several rationales for this trend8 4 One is to protect the
innocent adult who enters into a fair and reasonable contract in good faith
with a minor who appears to be over 18.85 There are minors who are
78. See, e.g., Tuck v. Payne, 17 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tenn. 1929).
79. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8.7, 297-98

(5th ed. 2003).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 525 n. 20 (quoting Lord Mansfield in Zouch v.
Parsons, (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1103 (K.B.), who wrote that the ability to disaffirm was
"given as a shield and not as a sword, [and] it [shall never] be turned into an offensive

weapon of fraud or injustice").
82. DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 481.
83. Dodson v. Shrader, 824 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tenn. 1992). The Dodson court called

this a modem trend. However, the benefit rule was used at least as early as 1879 in Hall v.
Butterfield, 59 N.H. 354, 359 (1879).
84. DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 487.
85. Id.
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experienced and sophisticated enough in the marketplace that it would
seem to be unjust to allow them the benefit of the American rule at the
expense of such adults.8 6 A second rationale flows from this first one. In
an American rule-state, adult merchants might reasonably decide to refuse
to contract with minors for fear that a minor will later invoke the infancy
doctrine and demand a full refund. s7 This may work to the detriment of
those minors who are experienced and sophisticated enough to operate in
the marketplace and have no intention of harming the adult, by effectively
excluding them from the marketplace. A third rationale is that the
American rule "does not appear consistent with.., proper moral influence
Rather than "encourag[ing] honesty and
upon young people[.],, 88
integrity," it "can only lead to the corruption of principles and encourage
young people in habits of trickery and dishonesty. 8 9
ii.

CurrentAlternatives to the American Rule

As a result of these rationales, at least two alternative rules have
developed under which the adult is required to refund less than the full
consideration paid if the minor disaffirms. 90 The first of these alternative
rules is the benefit rule. 91 It can be argued that this rule is an extension of
the necessaries doctrine.9 2 In Hall v. Butterfield, a New Hampshire court
reasoned that the basis for a minor's liability for the value of necessaries he
has received is that such goods and services provided a benefit to the
minor.93 The court then asked, "If the benefit is the foundation of the right,
why should it be limited to necessaries? ' 94 The court concluded that if a
minor disaffirms a contract, whether for necessaries or not, he is still liable
to the adult for the value of the benefit he received. 95 Minnesota 96 and
Arizona97 have also adopted the benefit rule. It has been argued that it
offers "a flexible rule which will prevent imposition upon the infant and
also tend to prevent the infant from imposing to any serious degree upon
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id., at 487-88.
Dodson, 824 S.W.2d at 550.
Id.
Id.
Id.
DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 490.
Id.
59 N.H. 354, 359 (1879).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Kelly v. Furlong, 261 N.W. 460 (Minn. 1935).
See, e.g., Valencia v. White, 654 P.2d 287 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
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others." 98 However, a criticism of the rule is that it requires a subjective
evaluation of the monetary value of the benefit to the particular minor.99
The difficulty of such an evaluation is shown in Valencia v. White where
the court, having stated that it was applying the benefit rule, proceeded to
hold the minor liable for the reasonable value of the repairs made to the
minor's truck, almost $20,000, even though00the truck had again broken
down soon after it was returned to the minor.'
The second alternative rule is the depreciation rule. 10 ' Under this rule,
when a minor disaffirms a contract, his recovery of the purchase price 10is2
reduced by the amount of depreciation of the consideration he received.
In other words, when the minor returns his consideration for a refund, the
adult merchant must only refund to the minor what that consideration is
now worth. As was described above, this is effectively the rule in England,
although it is not called the depreciation rule there. In Dodson v. Shrader,
a 16-year-old boy bought a truck from an adult who thought the boy was 18
or 19.103 The minor paid $4,900 in cash, which he had borrowed from his
girlfriend's grandmother. 104 When a problem developed, the minor could
not afford the repairs.'0 5 He nevertheless kept driving the truck and within
a year of the purchase the engine blew up and the truck's value dropped to
$500.106 The minor then sought to return the truck to the adult merchant
for a full refund. 10 7 The seller refused to accept the tender of the truck or to
refund the minor's money, and the minor sued.108 The Tennessee Supreme
Court decided to adopt the depreciation rule as follows:
[W]here the minor has not been overreached in any way, and there has
been no undue influence, and the contract is a fair and reasonable one,
and the minor has actually paid money on the purchase price, and taken
and used the article purchased, that he ought not to be permitted to
recover the amount actually paid, without allowing the vender of the
98. 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 238, at 43 (3d ed.. 1959).
99. DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 492.
100. Valencia, 654 P.2d at 291. The court stated that the trial court had found that it was
the minor's fault that the truck broke down a second time, and that this fact was binding on
appeal. However, even if this was true, one could still question whether the minor received
a benefit worth almost $20,000 to that particularminor.
101. Dodson, 824 S.W.2d at 548.

102. Id.
103. Id. at 546.
104. Id.

105. Id.
106. Id.

107. Id.
108. Id.
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goods reasonable compensation for the use of, depreciation, and0 9willful
or negligent damage to the article purchased, while in his hands.1

One could argue that the depreciation rule is a fair compromise
balancing the interests of the minor and the adult while avoiding the benefit
rule's problem of having to make a subjective evaluation of the monetary
value of the benefit received by a particular minor. However, there are two
problems with the depreciation rule. As mentioned above, the infancy
doctrine was created to protect minors from their own improvidence.
Under the depreciation rule, a minor could enter into a contract which,
while fair in its terms, is an unwise decision caused by the minor's
inexperience. The injustice to a few unlucky adults was supposed to be a
price worth paying in order to protect minors from their inexperience. One
can argue that the depreciation rule may "force the minor to bear the cost of
the very improvidence from which the infancy doctrine is supposed to
protect him. .10,, A second problem arises if the minor in a depreciation
rule-state makes a purchase on credit. As will be explained below, if
Dodson had purchased the truck on credit, and by the time its value had
decreased to $500 he had paid $500, he could return the truck without
having to pay extra for the depreciation. In other words, Dodson was
worse off for having paid the full price in cash.
iii. Suggested Alternatives to the American Rule
One commentator has suggested an alternative to the American rule
which he claims would avoid the difficulties of the current alternative rules.
In his 1995 article, Larry A. DiMatteo proposed the replacement of an
arbitrary age of majority with a case by case evaluation of whether the
person entering into the contract was mature enough to be held to its
terms.11 1 DiMatteo argues that such a case by case analysis is performed
for the other classes of persons thought not to have the capacity to enter
into contracts, i.e., the mentally ill and those under the influence of drugs or
alcohol.1 12 However, one might argue that it would be much easier to
evaluate the capacity of a mentally ill person (based on medical history and
expert witnesses, for example) or the capacity of an inebriated person
(based on what and how much was consumed, for example) than to
evaluate the maturity of a particular 17-year-old. DiMatteo also points out
109.
110.
111.
112.
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that the law holds minors liable for their torts and responsible for their
crimes and argues that
it is strange that they can still escape their
3
contractual liability."
One way of agreeing with DiMatteo's theory as an improvement on
current law, while dealing with the arguments against it, would be to take a
leaf out of Scotland's book. In Scotland, contracts entered into by minors
under 16 years old are void, but with an important exception.' 14 A minor
has the capacity to enter into a contract of a type which someone of his age
commonly enters into."15 For example, a five-year-old's candy purchase is
binding and a fifteen-year-old's movie ticket purchase is binding. 16 In
Scotland, contracts entered into by 16 and 17-year-olds have a rebuttable
presumption of validity. 1 7 Their contracts are binding unless they can
convince a court before reaching the age of 21 that the contract caused, or
was likely to cause, the minor substantial prejudice and the contract was
not of a kind which a reasonably prudent person under the same
circumstances would have entered into." 8 The Scottish rule thus takes into
account the reality of the increase of minors' experience and activity in the
marketplace while still protecting them from adults who might take
advantage of inexperienced or improvident minors.
C.

The English Minor's Liability When He Refuses to Pay for or
Return an Automobile He Purchased on Credit

Under the common law before 1987, if a minor acquired something on
credit, he could refuse to pay for it, keep it, and use his minority as a
defense to any suit for recovery by the seller. 1 9 The Minors' Contract Act
of 1987 was in part aimed at this situation and gave the court discretionary
power to order restitution to the seller. 20 The Act provides:
(1) Where(a) a person ("the plaintiff') has after the commencement of this Act
entered into a contract with another ("the defendant"), and
(b) the contract is unenforceable against the defendant (or he repudiates
113.
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it) because he was a minor when the contract was made,
the court may, if it is just and equitable to do so, require the defendant to
transfer to the plaintiff any property acquired by the defendant under the
contract, or any property representing it.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be taken to prejudice any other remedy
12 1
available to the plaintiff.
As the language of the law indicates, the adult is not entitled to
restitution as of right.122 The court has discretion. 123 Two main factors will
likely affect the court's decision. 124 The first is whether the minor still
possesses the property or any property representing it. 125 Therefore, if the
minor bought an automobile on credit and still has it, the court may simply
order the minor to return it to the seller. If the minor has traded the car for
a truck of the same value, for example, the court may order the minor to
give the truck to the seller. This may lead to difficult tracing issues for the
court. 12 6 However, the reason that the law limits the court to these two
options is that to order the minor to pay for the car out of his wider assets
would be to enforce indirectly an unenforceable contract. 127 The second
factor which will likely affect the court's decision is the fairness of the
original contract. 128 If the court determines that the price agreed to by the
minor was excessive, the court might order the minor to return the property
129
unless he pays a reasonable price fixed by the court.
Subsection 2 of the Minors' Contracts Act preserves for the seller any
other legal remedy that would have been available before 1987.130
Therefore, under the common law equitable doctrine of restitution, a minor
who has obtained goods by fraud (for example, by lying about his age at
the time of the purchase) may be ordered to return them to the seller if they
are still in his possession. 131 If the minor has already disposed of the
goods, this remedy is not available. 132 Since the statutory remedy allows
121.
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more
limited tracing and is not dependent on proof of fraud, it is much
33
likely nowadays that a seller would rely on the statutory remedy. 1
D.

The American Minor's Liability When He Refuses
to Payfor or
34
Return an Automobile He Purchased on Credit

In the case of a credit purchase, if the minor refuses to pay what he
owes, the adult vendor sues, and the minor uses his minority as a defense,
the minor is disaffirming the contract. Whether the state uses the American
rule, the depreciation rule, or the benefit rule, when the minor disaffirms a
purchase, he is under an enforceable duty to return as much of the
consideration as he has left in his possession. 35 "The infancy doctrine is
designed to protect the minor, sometimes at the expense of an innocent
vendor, but it is not to136be used to bilk merchants out of property as well as
proceeds of the sale."'
Once the minor returns whatever he has left, if anything, the financial
outcome will once again depend on the rule of the particular state. In an
American rule state, it is clear that the adult must return to the minor
whatever money the minor has paid up to that point. The outcome is less
clear under the depreciation and benefit rules.
As was mentioned above, when the Dodson court stated the
depreciation rule, it held that it only applied if the minor had made a cash
purchase. In such a case, the minor's refund would be less any
depreciation to the automobile. Thus it would seem that if a minor
purchases an automobile on credit in a state applying the Dodson court's
depreciation rule, whether the adult is returned to status quo ante will
depend on how much the minor has already paid. If he has thus far paid the
adult less than the amount of depreciation, the minor need not make any
extra payment from his wider assets, and the adult will have suffered a loss.
If he has thus far paid the adult more than the amount of depreciation,
perhaps the adult would only have to return to the minor what he has paid
thus far minus the depreciation. In such a case, the adult would be returned
to status quo ante.
Interestingly, the New Hampshire cases stating the benefit rule did not
specifically state that it only applied to cash purchases. Therefore, it is not
133. Id. at 551.
134. It should be noted that there are few, if any, cases directly on point for this scenario.
Perhaps merchants take more care over to whom they sell when the purchase is on credit,
and often refuse to sell on credit to minors.
135. Halbman, 298 N.W.2d at 566.
136. Id.at 248-49.
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clear that a minor in a benefit rule state would not be required to use his
wider assets to pay for the difference between the amount he has paid thus
far and the benefit he has received.
Thus there are two main differences between U.S. and English law in
this situation. First, when an English minor refuses to pay for something he
bought on credit and the adult sues, the court has discretion as to whether
the minor must return what he purchased to the adult. This decision will be
based on what is just and equitable. In the United States, the minor is
under an affirmative duty to return what he purchased before he may
escape further payments. In this respect, it seems that English law is more
favorable to the minor than U.S. law. On the other hand, the second major
difference here is that the English court is permitted to do some, albeit
limited, tracing in cases where the minor is no longer in possession of the
purchased item. U.S. law does not allow any such tracing. This is
therefore another area where American law is more favorable to minors
than English law.
V. Conclusion
This Note set out to compare the English and U.S. infancy doctrines
and then to compare what happens in each country when a minor seeks to
disaffirm a contract. It seems fairly clear that the majority of American
states give far greater protection to the interests of the minor in such
situations. Any detriment to adult merchants who deal with minors in good
faith is considered a reasonable price worth paying for this protection.
English law seeks to recognize the interests of both groups. The result is
that both English minors and American minors living in the majority of
American states may disaffirm contracts that are not for necessaries, but
when English minors return their consideration the adult must only refund
to them what that consideration is now worth, whereas the American adult
must give a full refund. Some American states have instituted rules similar
to the English one. However, even the English rule and the rules of this
minority of American states sometimes fail to protect minors who make
improvident contracts due to their inexperience. Perhaps both countries
should look to Scotland, which has taken logical, common sense steps to
protect both groups while recognizing the reality of today's marketplace
and the increased activity of minors there.

